Preliminary Requirements for Condemnation in Missouri: Necessity, Public Use, and Good Faith Negotiations by Baumgart, Bradley J.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 44 
Issue 3 Summer 1979 Article 5 
Summer 1979 
Preliminary Requirements for Condemnation in Missouri: 
Necessity, Public Use, and Good Faith Negotiations 
Bradley J. Baumgart 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bradley J. Baumgart, Preliminary Requirements for Condemnation in Missouri: Necessity, Public Use, and 
Good Faith Negotiations, 44 MO. L. REV. (1979) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss3/5 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
PRELIMINARY REQUIREMENTS
FOR CONDEMNATION IN MISSOURI:
NECESSITY, PUBLIC USE, AND
GOOD FAITH NEGOTIATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Upon receipt of a petition for condemnation an attorney for the defen-
dant in the action reasonably might turn to ' volume two, sections
2331-2361 of Missouri Practice in order to get an idea of the procedures
which are to be followed. Here he would find an invaluable step-by-step
explanation of a condemnation proceeding. There is, however, a vexing
problem in the use of a practice manual in this area. Missouri Practice, as
well as other publications oriented toward practical usage' necessarily pro-
vides only a cursory view of some of the substantive issues which may arise
in a condemnation action. This work will examine three of the more im-
portant substantive issues; public use, necessity and good faith negotia-
tions. A land owner may only be deprived of his land by the exercise of the
power of eminent domain if the taking is for a public use2 and the land
taken is necessary to fulfill this use.3 Moreover, the condemnor must
establish that there has been a good faith offer to purchase the land in
question. 4 To put these issues in perspective, it will be helpful first to ex-
plore the legal principles underlying the exercise of condemnation and
then to summarize the procedures that are to be followed in a condemna-
tion proceeding.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Power of Eminent Domain
Eminent domain is the power of the government to take or authorize
the taking of private property for public use without the owner's consent.
The power is inherent in the sovereign to enable it to guard its own ex-
istence and promote the interests and welfare of the community at large.
While no constitutional provision specifically vests the power of eminent
domain in the state,- certain limitations of the power are enumerated in
the Missouri Constitution. The constitution provides that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.6 It also states
1. See Mo. Bar C.L.E., C6ndemnation Practice, passim (1973); Board of
Regents v. Palmer, 356 Mo. 946, 204 S.W.2d 291 (1947).
2. Kansas City v. St. L. & S.F..Ry., 230 Mo. 369, 130 S.W. 273 (1910).
3. Kansas City v. Kindle, 446 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. 1969).
4. State ex rel. Highway Comm'n v. Cady, 372 S.W.2d 639 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1963).
5. State ex Tel. Coffman v. Crain, 308 S.W.2d 451 (Spr. Mo. App. 1958).
6. MO. CONST. art. I, § 26.
1
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the limitation that private property shall not be taken for private use with
or without compensation unless by consent of the owner, except for private
ways of necessity and for drains and ditches across the lands of others for
agricultural and sanitary purposes. 7
The exercise of the power of eminent domain is a discretionary func-
tion vested in the legislature. The power may be exercised by the
legislature itself, or more commonly, may be delegated by statute to a state
agency, inferior government unit, or private or public corporation." When
the power is exercised by such an agency or other entity the general rules of
law regarding eminent domain apply. The agency or entity9 deriving con-
demnation power from a statute normally must exercise it in strict confor-
mance with the statute.' 0 However, charter cities and counties occupy a
special position in regard to the exercise of the power of eminent domain.
They need not always strictly observe the general rules laid down by ena-
bling statutes or rules of court. I I
B. Condemnation Procedures
Prior to filing a petition the condemnor must make a good faith offer
to purchase the desired property. This prerequisite is reflected in the
Missouri Rules of Court,12 where the contents of a petition in condemna-
tion are spelled out. To be included in the petition is "a statement either
that condemnor or owner cannot agree on the proper compensation to be
paid or that the owner is incapable of contracting, is unknown, cannot be
found or is a nonresident of the state." After the offer has been rejected, or
one of the alternative circumstances is present the condemnor must file a
petition in the circuit court of the appropriate county and city. 13 The ap-
propriate court is where the land or a part thereof is located.14 In addition
to the statement concerning the good faith offer the petition must contain:
a description of the land, the names of the owners of the property to be
condemned or a statement that they are unknown, a statement of peti-
tioner's authority to condemn, a general statement of the use for which the
property is to be condemned, and a prayer for the appointment of three
7. Id. § 28.
8. See generally Mo. CONST. art. III, § 48; art. IV, § 41; art. VI, § 21;
RSMO ch. 523 (1969); Annbar Assoc. v. Westside Redev. Corp., 397 S.W.2d 635
(Mo. En Banc 1965).
9. RSMo §§ 388.210-.410 (railroads), 227.120 (highway commission),
204.340 (sewer districts) (1969).
10. State ex rel. R.W. Filkey, Inc. v. Scott, 407 S.W.2d 79 (St. L. Mo. App.
1966).
11. Mo. R. Civ. P. 86.01. Constitutional charter cities derive their power
from the constitution. Mo. CONST. art. VI, § 19(a). But see Bueche v. Kansas
City, 492 S.W.2d 835 (Mo. 1973).
12. Mo. R. Civ. P. 86.04.
13. Mo. R. Civ. P. 86.02.
14. RSMo § 523.010 (1969).
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commissioners in a commissioner's hearing to assess the damages flowing
from the taking.'- Upon the filing of the petition the clerk issues a sum-
mons which must give ten days notice of the commissioner's hearing on the
petition. 16 At this hearing, unless the defendant landowner challenges the
right of the condemnor to exercise the power of eminent domain or the
condemnor fails to establish a good faith offer to purchase and a refusal,
the appointment of three commissioners follows. 17 After viewing the
premises the commissioners file their report with the clerk of the circuit
court which includes a description of the property and the amount of net
damages sustained as a result of the taking.1 8 The condemning authority
may pay the clerk of the court the assessed damages and take possession of
the property.' 9 Within ten days after notice of the award has been given,
either party may file written exceptions to the report of the commis-
sioners. 20 If exceptions are filed, a trial by jury, or by judge if ajury is waiv-
ed, is held and the damages of the property owner are determined in the
adversary setting.21
III. SUBSTANTIVE PREREQUISITES TO CONDEMNATION
A. Necessity
Prior to the exercise of the power of eminent domain the condemnor
determines that the taking of the particular interest in the property is
necessary. This determination of necessity is the responsibility of the
legislature or the grantee of the power of eminent domain. 22 Courts con-
sider the matter a legislative rather than a judicial question; 23 consequent-
ly they will not upset the determination unless there is evidence of fraud,
bad faith or arbitrary exercise of legislative discretion, 24 or unless the
power to determine necessity is beyond the scope of a charter or statute.2 5
One court stated that the determination of necessity was "not ... subject
to review unless the taking ends up being for a private purpose."26 Thus,
15. Mo. R. CIv. P. 86.04.
16. Mo. R. Civ. P. 86.05.
17. Mo. R. CIv. P. 86.06; VOLZ, LOGAN, BLACKMAR, Methods of Practice,
2 MISSOURI PRACTICE SERIES 321 (1961). For the good faith negotiations require-
ment, see School Dist. of Clayton v. Kelsey, 355 Mo. 478, 196 S.W.2d 860 (1946);
State v. Cady, 372 S.W.2d 639 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963).
18. Mo. R. Civ. P. 86.06; VOLZ, LOGAN, BLACKMAR, Methods of Practice,
2 MISSOURI PRACTICE SERIES 321 (1961).
19. Kansas City v. McElroy, 331 S.W.2d 28 (K.C. Mo. App. 1959).
20. Mo. R. Civ. P. 86.08.
21. Id.
22. In re Armory Site, 282 S.W.2d 464 (K.C. Mo. App. 1955).
23. State ex rel. Coffman v. Crain, 308 S.W.2d 451 (Spr. Mo. App. 1958).
24. In re Armory Site, 282 S.W.2d 464 (K.C. Mo. App. 1955); In re Pro-
ceedings to Grade, 270 S.W.2d 863 (Mo. 1954).
25. St. Louis County v. City of Manchester, 360 S.W.2d 638 (Mo. 1962);
Union Elec. Co. v. Jones, 356 S.W.2d 857 (Mo. 1962).
26. State ex rel. Highway Comm'n v. Shultz, 241 Mo. App. 570, 243 S.W.2d
808 (Spr. 1951). 3
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the standard of review is normally narrow, although a stricter standard of
review applies when the exercise of the power of eminent domain is for a
private way of necessity. 27
The amount of proprty subject to the power of eminent domain is
specifically limited by the Missouri Constitution to the amount reasonably
necessary to effectuate the intended purpose. 2 8 The courts generally defer
to the "delegated agents of the state as to the appropriate amount of
property which should be appropriated. 2 9 The courts seem to be more
willing to upset a determination of necessity when the extent of the interest
taken is being questioned rather than the amount of land or the taking
itself. For instance, in Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Kansas City the
court held that the taking of the fee is not necessary where an easement
alone would accomplish the purpose.3 0
Since the issue is legislative, the necessity of the condemnation is a
question which may be determined without notice and hearing.3 1 The only
available forum to attack the determination of necessity is in the commis-
sioner's hearing on the condemnation petition. The issue should be raised
sufficiently in advance of this hearing in order to give the condemnor ade-
quate notice that it will be contested. This may be done either by answer 2
or by motion to dismiss.3 3 The Missouri rules indicate that if the issue is not
raised at this point the only issue to be determined at the commissioner's
hearing is whether proper notice was given.3 4 Only rarely can the issue of
necessity be litigated subsequent to this hearing.35
B. Public Use
It is axiomatic that private property may be appropriated through
eminent domain only if the purpose of the action is "public," that is, if the
27. Welch v. Shipman, 357 Mo. 838, 210 S.W.2d 1008 (1948). From this it
might be argued that when the taking is by a private agency there should be a
heavier burden of proof on the necessity issue.
28. MO. CONST. art. I, § 27.
29. State v. Curtis, 359 Mo. 402, 222 S.W.2d 64 (En Banc 1949).
30. 448 S.W.2d 612, 615 (Mo. 1969).
31. State ex rel. Coffman v. Crain, 308 S.W.2d 451 (Spr. Mo. App. 1958).
32. VOLZ, LOGAN. BLACKMAR, Methods of Practice, 2 MISSOURI PRACTICE
SERIES 320 (1961).
33. State exrel. Highway Comm'nv. Shultz, 241 Mo. App. 570, 243 S.W.2d
808 (Spr. 1951). The issue has also been litigated in a mandamus proceeding
when the State Highway Commission sought to force a circuit court to exercise itsjurisdiction in a condemnation action. State v. Curtis, 359 Mo. 402, 222 S.W.2d
64 (En Banc 1949).
34. Mo. R. Civ. P. 86.06.
35. Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Kansas City, 448 S.W.2d 612 (Mo.
1969) (in a subsequent quiet title action it was determined that an easement was
the extent of the interest taken in the prior condemnation action because only an
easement was necessary to fulfill the intended use).
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use made of the property by the condemning authority is one which may be
labeled a public use.3 6 In Missouri, the determination of this often crucial
question regarding the public nature of a proposed use for condemned
land is resolved to the judiciary. 37 The judicial determination may be
made without regard to any legislative declaration made by the condem-
nor that the use is a public one, although a similar legislative determina-
tion of the question of necessity would be more or less conclusive.3 s As a
consequence of the freedom of the courts to make their own determination
of what is a public use the issue has been more often litigated than has the
issue of necessity.
The courts have taken various views in the attempt to define the exact
parameters of the term "public use." 39 The different views, however, may
be grouped together under one of two broad positions. One position,
which may be termed the "restricted use" position, opines that there is no
public use unless the property to be condemned is taken into the direct
control of the public or of public agencies, or the public has the right to use
the appropriated property in some way.40 The other position may be called
the "expanded use" position. Any use that enlarges resources, increases in-
dustrial potential and promotes the productive power of a considerable
number of inhabitants in a given area, or that leads to the growth of towns
and creation of new resources for the employment of labor and capital,
contributes to the general welfare and prosperity of the whole community.
Such a use is deemed a public one under the expanded use position.4 '
. Missouri courts have used the more expanded interpretation of what
constitutes a public use. In Missouri it is not requisite to a finding of public
use that all or even a large part of the community actually be benefited
from the intended improvement; rather, it is sufficient if the improvement
will be a considerable benefit to the public as a whole.42 This expanded use
view is well illustrated by the allowance of condemnation for urban
renewal. 43 Slum clearance projects have been upheld against constitu-
tional attack for many years.44 Moreover, in a case where a private
redevelopment corporation condemned land for urban renewal and
36. Dickey v. Tennison, 27 Mo. 373 (1858). For a development of the public
use concept over the years, see Comment, What Use Is a Public Use in Eminent
Domain?, ST. LouIs U. LJ. 316 (1957).
37. MO. CONST. art. I, § 28; In re Colman Heights, 401 S.W.2d 385 (Mo.
1966).
38. See notes 23-25 and accompanying text supra.
39. See Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use In The Law of Eminent
Domain, 20 B.U. L. Rev. 615 (1940).
40. 1 J. LEWIS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 164 (2d ed. 1900).
41. P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN 130-31 (2d ed. 1875).
42. Arata v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 351 S.W.2d 717 (Mo. 1961); In re
Kansas City Ordinance No. 39946, 289 Mo. 569, 252 S.W. 404 (En Banc 1923).
43. Kintzele v. City of St. Louis, 347 S.W.2d 695 (Mo. En Banc 1961).
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neither the government nor any governmental agency ever owned the
property the condemnation was deemed to be for a public use and
therefore constitutional. 45 Missouri's constitutional provisions are not
viewed as a hindrance to this type of condemnation because the power of
eminent domain may be properly delegated to private organizations as
long as the use for which it is delegated and exercised is a public one. 4"
Where private condemnation is sought for some private use other than
those (such as sanitary drainage) specifically outlined in the Missouri Con-
stitution, it is clear that the constitutional provision prohibiting a taking
unless it be for public use would be offended.47 Thus the Missouri courts
generally have taken a liberal position with respect to what types of uses are
public. The limits of Missouri's position would appear to be indicated in
Kansas City v. Kindle4" where the court held that the maintenance of the
"character" of a neighborhood constitutes a public use.
In reviewing a determination of public use, the courts in Missouri
ascertain whether the intended public use is probable. Condemnation of
more land than will be needed immediately on a particular project will be
sustained if the condemning authority can show that there is a "general
plan" which requires the use of the excess property in the future.49 There
must be, however, evidence such as official action indicating the existence
of a plan and not merely oral testimony as to future intentions.5 0 When the
implementation of the plan hinges upon some remote contingency the find-
ing of a public use will not be sustained. In Kansas City v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Railroad, 51 it was shown that the desired land would be put to a
public use only if a viaduct were to be built. At that time the city could not
adopt an ordinance for building the viaduct because it would violate the
city charter to pass such an ordinance when the funds were not on hand for
such a project. The court found that the intended public use was too
speculative.5 2
The public use issue generally is raised in the same manner as the
necessity issue, 53 that is, by answer or motion to dismiss. In addition to rais-
ing. the question of public use by these methods, the issue may be reviewed
45. Annbar Assoc. v. Westside Redev. Corp., 397 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. En
Banc 1965).
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Welch v. Shipman, 357 Mo. 838, 210 S.W.2d 1008 (1948).
48. 446 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. 1969).
49. State v. Curtis, 359 Mo. 402, 222 S.W.2d 64 (En Banc 1949).
50. Kansas City v. St. L. & S.F. Ry., 230 Mo. 369, 130 S.W. 273 (1910).
51. Id.
52. See also St. Louis v. Butler Co., 223 S.W.2d 831 (St. L. Mo. App. 1949)
(where a city attempted to condemn a dead end street which was located between
two parcels of land which were privately owned, the court found the possibility of
a public use too remote).
53. See notes 31-36 and accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 44
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in a taxpayer suit challenging the propriety of using public funds for a par-
ticular purpose. 54
C. Good Faith Negotiations
In addition to a determination that the taking is necessary and that the
purpose is a public one, the condemning authority must attempt in good
faith to purchase the land from its owner. The Missouri statutes specifical-
ly provide that the condemning authority may file a petition in condemna-
tion only if the "condemnor or owner cannot agree on proper compensa-
tion." 55 This requirement is waived if the owner is incapable of contrac-
ting, if he is unkown, cannot be found or if he is a nonresident of the
state.-6 The prerequisite of good faith negotiations is implemented by the
Missouri Rules of Court; the rules require that the condemnation petition
include a statement that the owner and condemnor cannot agree on the
price to be paid for the land.5 7 Constitutional charter cities may be exempt
from this requirement if their charter explicitly provides that negotiations
are not required. 58
The phrase "cannot agree on proper compensation" in both the statute
and court rule has been interpreted to required these good faith negotia-
tions. 59 The negotiations are jurisdictional; unless they have been pleaded
and proved the court has no power to entertain a condemnation action.60
The underlying rationale for the good faith negotiations requirement is
that the power of eminent domain is exercised as a matter of necessity, and
there is no necessity to condemn property until acquisition by negotiation
has been attempted unsuccessfully. A landowner should not be brought
into court, nor should dockets be burdened with condemnation litigation
until it is shown affirmatively that private negotiations will not accomplish
the desired end. 61
The burden of proving and pleading good faith negotiations clearly
rests on the condemning authority.6 2 Once the condemnor has sustained
his burden of proving good faith negotiations the condemnee then has the
burden of proving bad faith in the negotiations.63 Since the burden is on
the condemnor to prove good faith negotiations it would seem to always be
54. Kintzele v. City of St. Louis, 347 S.W.2d 695 (Mo. En Banc 1961).
55. RSMo § 523.010 (1969).
56. Id.
57. Mo. R. CIv. P. 86.04.
58. See MO. R. Civ. P. 86.01.
59. State ex rel. Highway Comm'n v. Cady, 372 S.W.2d 639 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1963).
60. School Dist. of Clayton v. Kelsey, 355 Mo. 478, 196 S.W.2d 860 (1946).
61. State ex reL. Highway Comm'n v. Cady, 372 S.W.2d 639 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1963).
62. School Dist. of Clayton v. Kelsey, 355 Mo. 478, 196 S.W.2d 860 (1946).
63. Shelby County R-IV School Dist. v. Herman, 392 S.W.2d 609, 612 (Mo.
1965); School Dist. of Clayton v. Kelsey, 355 Mo. 478, 196 S..W.2d 860 (1946).
509
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in issue in a condemnation action and therefore need not specifically be
raised by the condemnee. 64 Pleading good faith negotiations should not
present too difficult a problem. There is, however, one caveat which should
be brought to light. Even though a conclusory statement that the parties
could not agree on proper compensation has been held sufficient to confer
jurisdiction, 5 this form of pleading has been questioned by the Missouri
Supreme Court.8 6 The fault found with this type of pleading is that it does
not allege that a settlement has been attempted or that offers have been
made or rejected; thus it leaves room for the inference that the condemnor
believed at the outset that no agreement was possible and therefore made
no attempt to settle. Following the supreme court's direction, the petition
should allege enough to show that bona fide negotiations have occurred
but that the parties were unable to arrive at a settlement.
Proving good faith negotiations may either be done by oral testimony
of inability to agree or may be done by showing facts and circumstances
which support the good faith negotiations allegation. 67 An offer sufficient
to create a binding contract upon acceptance must be made to the land-
owner. 68 This does not mean that the condemning authority must offer
any particular amount of money. In fact, under appropriate circum-
stances the condemnor may contend that the benefit to any remaining
land outweighs or is equal to the value of the land sought, and so no money
need be offered. 69 Where the property is held by husband and wife in
tenancy by the entirety an offer which is rejected by one of the co-tenants
satisfies the requirement.7 0 After one co-tenant has refused an offer it is
clear that it will be necessary to resort to the courts in order to acquire the
land. Since the possibility of partition exists when land is held in other
forms of joint ownership this reasoning may not apply to land held in joint
tenancy or tenants in common. While there are no cases dealing with this
issue in Missouri there are cases from other jurisdictions which do not draw
this distinction between tenants by the entirety and other forms of co-
tenancies. "
64. See notes 31-36 and accompanying text supra.
65. State ex rel. Highway Comm'n v. Cady, 372 S.W.2d 639 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1963).
66. State ex rel. Weatherby Advertising v. Conley, 527 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. En
Banc 1975).
67. State ex rel. Highway Comm'n v. Cady, 372 S.W.2d 639 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1963). There also appears to be no reason why the parties may not stipulate
that good faith negotiations have taken place. See 29 C.J.S. Eminent Domain §
224(4).
68. State ex rel. Highwvay Comm'n v. Pinkley, 474 S.W.2d 46 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1971).
69. State ex rel. Highway Comm'n v. Cady, 372 S.W.2d 639 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1963).
70. M & A Elec. Pwr. Coop. v. Georger, 480 S.W.2d 868 (Mo. 1972).
71. Town of Dovian v. Kavookjian, 151 Conn. 659, 202 A.2d 147 (1964);
Town of Hertford v. Harvis, 263 N.C. 776, 140 S.E.2d 420 (1965).
510 [Vol. 44
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Whether an offer may be considered in bad faith on the basis of the
adequacy of the amount has been discussed in several cases nationwide. 7 2
This "market value of land" theory73 contemplates that an offer should ap-
proximate the actual damages resulting from the taking in order to be in
good faith. The majority of the courts which have considered the theory
have rejected it. While Missouri has not specifically dealt with the question
it seems likely that Missouri would join this majority or maybe even im-
pliedly has. In School District of Clayton v. Kelsey, 74 an offer of $15,000
was not considered in bad faith even when the actual damages determined
by the jury was $34,500. The Missouri Supreme Court has also upheld an
offer which was one-sixth the landowner's alleged damages in the face of
an attack on the good faith of the offer. 75 These cases indicate that the
relationship between the offer and the market value of the property to be
condemned is not significant in the determination of good faith. 76
The good faith negotiations requirement takes on added dimensions
when there is federal money involved in the project for which condemna-
tion is desired. This is due to the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real
Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 77 hereinafter referred to as the
URA. Under the Act, to receive money from the federal government the
condemning authority must follow specific procedures in attempting to
purchase the property prior to bringing any condemnation action. The
condemning authority must obtain an appraisal of the property. The land-
owner must be afforded an opportunity to accompany the appraiser on the
latter's visit to the land. The appraiser must submit his calculation of
either the value of the improvements on the land or the cost of removing
them. The appraiser also establishes what just compensation should be for
the desired property. The amount is never to be lower than the fair market
value. A summary of how the appraiser's final figure was reached is to be
furnished to the owner. The condemning authority must then make an of-
fer to purchase the land; it must offer, at minimum, the appraised
amount. The purposes of these requirements are fourfold: to avoid litiga-
tion, to relieve congestion in the courts, to assure consistent treatmentfor
owners in the many federal programs, and to promote public confidence
72. See Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 211 (1963).
73. Wamplerv. Trustees of Indiana Univ., 241 Ind. 449, 172 N.E.2d 67, 90
A.L.R.2d 204, 211 (1961).
74. 196 S.W.2d 860 (Mo. 1946).
75. Shelby County R-IV School Dist. v. Herman, 392 S.W.2d 609 (Mo.
1965). See also State v. Cady, 400 S.W.2d 481 (K.C. Mo. App. 1965) (where the
court found good faith negotiations when the condemnor had offered no money
on the theory that special benefits exceeded damages, and the landowner was
claiming $2,800).
76. Quaere whether there is a point where an offer is so small in relationship
to the value of the propery as to constitute a sham indulged to establish jurisdic-
tion and will be found in bad faith.
77. 42 U.S.C. 4651 (1971). 9
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in federal land acquisition practices.78 While these objectives are
praiseworthy, the requirements of this federal statute may unduly burden
local condemning authorities because of the complexities and expense of
formal appraisals.
There is some suggestion that the precondemnation procedures sec-
tion of the URA apply only when the federal money to be received by a
particular project will be used in acquiring the desired property.79
Although there is no square holding in Missouri, the supreme court has in-
dicated that the URA requirements are triggered whenever federal money
is involved in a project, regardless of whether the federal money will be
used in acquiring the condemned property. 0
The URA creates no rights in the condemnee even though it is design-
ed partially to protect him.8 1 The courts in Missouri, however, have in at
least two instances found that a defendant in a condmenation action does
have standing to assert that the federal procedures were not followed.8 2 In
State ex rel. Weatherby Advertising v. Conley"8 the court held that since
there was a Missouri statute84 requiring the Highway Commission to follow
federal guidelines in order to secure federal funds, the condemnee had
standing to assert the lack of compliance with the federal guidelines.
There is an alternative method by which a condemnee may obtain stand-
ing to assert a lack of compliance with the URA. If the condemning
authority has entered into a contract with a federal agency under which
the condemnor agrees to follow the federal procedures and the federal
agency agrees to supplyt money for a project, the condemnee may enforce
the contract and require the condemning authority to comply with the
federal procedures as a third party donee beneficiary of the contract. 85 It
should be noted that the rights in this situation arise from the contract and
not the URA. Therefore, when utilizing this approach a condemnee must
pay close attention to the particular terms in the contract which he is en-
forcing.
78. Id.
79. Rhodes v. City of Chicago, 516 F.2d 1373 (7th Cir. 1975).
80. State ex rel. Weatherby Advertising v. Conley, 527 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. En
Banc 1975). At least one United States District Court has specifically held that
certain other sections of the Act are triggered when federal money is involved in
the project. Lake Park Home Owners v. HUD, 443 F. Supp. 6 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
81. Will-Tex Plastics Mfg., Inc. v. HUD, 346 F. Supp. 654 (E.D. Pa. 1972),
aff'd., 478 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1973).
82. State ex rel. Weatherby Advertising v. Conley, 527 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. En
Banc 1975); Bethone v. HUD, 376 F. Supp. 1074 (W.D. Mo. 1972).
83. 527 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. En Banc 1975). Prohibition was held to be an ap-
propriate remedy because the court lacked jurisdiction to proceed in the condem-
nation suit.
84. RSMo § 226.150 (1969).
85. Bethone v. HUD, 376 F. Supp. 1074 (W.D. Mo. 1972) (issue brought to
court by suit for specific performance of the contract).
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IV. CONCLUSION
While the practice manuals, rules of court and Missouri statutes refer
incidentally to the rights of a condemnee to raise the necessity, the public
use and the good faith negotiations issues, the substance of these rights has
remained tucked away in the case law. In some instances a condemnee
may raise these rights in order to delay the proceedings because time to a
condemnor usually means money. However unpraiseworthy this purpose
is, asserting these rights serves another more important function. Raising
these issues in a condemnation proceeding also insures that the power of
eminent domain will only be used under the appropriate circumstances.
This is important in a country which professes a high regard for the
property rights of its citizens.
BRADLEY J. BAUMGART
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